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Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement and Cheapened 
Achievement: A New Dilemma 
 
Abstract. Recent discussions of cognitive enhancement often note that drugs and technologies that improve 
cognitive performance may do so at the risk of “cheapening” our resulting cognitive achievements (e.g., Kass 
2004; Agar 2010; Sandel 2012; 2007; Harris 2011). While there are several possible responses to this worry, 
we will highlight what we take to be one of the most promising—one which draws on a recent strand of 
thinking in social and virtue epistemology to construct an integrationist defence of cognitive enhancement. 
(e.g., Pritchard 2010; Palermos 2015; Clark 2015). According to such a line, there is—despite initial 
appearances to the contrary—no genuine tension between using enhancements to attain our goals and 
achieving these goals in a valuable way provided the relevant enhancement is appropriately integrated into the 
agent’s cognitive architecture (in some suitably specified way). In this paper, however, we show that the kind 
of integration recommended by such views will likely come at a high cost. More specifically, we highlight a 
dilemma for users of pharmacological cognitive enhancement: they can (1) meet the conditions for cognitive 
integration (and on this basis attain valuable achievements) at the significant risk of dangerous dependency, 
or (2) remain free of such dependency while foregoing integration and the valuable achievements that such 
integration enables. After motivating and clarifying the import of this dilemma, we offer recommendations 
for how future cognitive enhancement research may offer potential routes for navigating past it.  
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1. Introduction 
In contemporary bioethics, the human enhancement debate focuses on the ethical ramifications 
of improving ourselves through the use of increasingly sophisticated forms of medicine and 
technology1. Some of this literature focuses on the possibility of enhancing our moral 
motivations and behaviour2, while other work in this area focuses instead on the ways in which 
drugs might improve our emotional lives and our closest relationships.3 In this paper, our 
primary interest will be in cognitive enhancement, which involves improving or augmenting “internal 
or external information processing systems” (Bostrom and Sandberg, 2009)—in particular, we 
 
1 For example, see Clarke et al. (2016) for a comprehensive overview of some of the most popular arguments for 
and against enhancement. In addition, see Juengst and Moseley (2016) for a summary of key debates on human 
enhancement and for exploration of how the literature on enhancement relates to questions about the proper limits 
of healthcare. 
2 See Persson and Savulecsu (2008; 2012) for the most well-known work on moral enhancement. 
3 For example, see Kraemer (2011) for an in-depth exploration of whether induced emotions can be authentic and 
see Earp et al. (2012; 2013) for work on how we might safely and effectively use medical interventions to address 
relationship problems and help people detach from abusive relationships.  
will consider one way in which cognitive enhancement might, counterintuitively, make us worse 
off. While there is lively debate about the conditions under which a given intervention 
constitutes an enhancement, we can think of cognitive enhancements generally as standing in 
contrast with therapeutic improvements—i.e., interventions that merely repair or treat some form of 
dysfunction4. In other words, cognitive enhancements improve cognitive dispositions, 
performances, capacities and well-being in a way that goes beyond correcting pathology (Juengst 
and Moseley, 2015)5. 
 
Of course, there are many widely accepted ways of improving cognitive capacities beyond the 
baseline—for example, taking part in study sessions, ingesting caffeine, and eating a healthy diet. 
However, the most interesting philosophical and ethical questions arise when we turn to 
interventions that might have more potent effects. Relevant current and possible future examples 
include brain computer interfaces (BCIs)6, neural implants, genetic engineering7, and 
pharmacological cognitive enhancements (hereafter, PCEs)8—drugs that improve our memory, 
focus, intelligence, and so on. Our central concern in this paper relates to the use of current and 
future PCEs (for example, modafinil, amphetamines, methylphenidate, and future drugs that 
likely use similar neurological mechanisms). However, as we’ll later explore, our conclusion also 
has important and surprising ramifications for how we might think of some of these other forms 
of enhancement. 
 
It’s obvious why PCEs are alluring.  On a personal level, an effective cognitive enhancement 
drug might provide an edge in one’s career, make one a shaper conversationalist, and help one 
learn new skills at a faster rate (as well as perform old skills more effectively)9. Further, when we 
think about the well-being of society more broadly, there is good reason to suppose that PCEs 
could help to increase the speed at which important new developments emerge to improve 
quality of life—treatments for currently fatal diseases, for example. 
 
 
4 See Gyngell and Selgeild (2016) for a thorough inventory of the ways in which we might define “enhancement.”  
5 Note that this improvement can involve improving existing capacities or generating new ones—so, a memory-
boosting drug would be a cognitive enhancement, but so too would be an instance of genetic engineering that allows 
us to communicate telepathically. 
6 See e.g., He et al. (2020) for a recent, general introduction to brain-computer interfaces and neural implants. 
7 See e.g., Knot and Doudna (2018) for an explanation of how CRISPR-Cas guides the future of genetic 
engineering in humans. 
8 See e.g., Maslen et al. (2014) for an in-depth discussion of the ethics of PCE use. 
9 See e.g., Gilleen et al. (2014) and Linssen et al. (2014) for some research on how both modafinil and 
methylphenidate might improve learning. 
However, bioconservative ethicists warn that we should be careful about blithely endorsing the 
use of such enhancements. There are many different reasons why one might adopt such a 
cautious line, ranging from concerns about exacerbating extant inequalities in society to 
suggestions that boosting intelligence may not promote well-being as much as one might think.10 
Our focus in the following sections will be on one specific worry: that PCEs (and cognitive 
enhancement more broadly) make our achievements less valuable. 
 
In section two, we’ll explore exactly why one might plausibly worry that cognitive enhancement 
“cheapens” achievement, and look at how one particular response—the integrationist response—is 
especially well-positioned to respond to this worry. In sections three and four, however, we will 
argue that despite the integrationist defence’s initial promise, there is a serious and unexplored 
dilemma waiting in the wings for current and likely future pharmacological cognitive 
enhancement. This reveals the Problem of Cheapened Achievements to be more difficult to 
address than has been appreciated. More specifically, we will show why the integrationist defence 
leads to a situation in which having valuable enhanced achievements come at the price of 
significant drug dependency and an ongoing requirement to increase dosage (thereby also 
increasing the risk of serious health problems). As we’ll see, whether the Problem of Cheapened 
Achievements can be resolved via an integrationist strategy depends very much on the future 
state of science and medicine. 
 
2. Cognitive enhancement, achievement and integration 
2.1 The cheapened achievements problem  
Various bioconservative philosophers have advanced what we will called the cheapened achievements 
problem for cognitive enhancement. In some places, this is articulated as a worry about cheating 
(e.g., Schermer 2008) or unfairness (e.g., Faber et al. 2015)—that, for example, students who take 
drugs like modafinil gain an unfair advantage over their peers, and are perhaps consequently less 
deserving of their resulting grades. However, there is a deeper worry at play—namely, that 
because cognitive enhancements can help us attain our cognitive goals faster and with less effort, 
the resulting achievements themselves are importantly less valuable than if the same goals were 
attained without enhancement.11 This means that even if considerations to do with competition 
 
10 See e.g., Giubilini and Minerva (2019) for consideration of proposals designed to combat enhancement-inducted 
inequality, and see Carter and Gordon (2013) for some challenges to the assumption that cognitive enhancement 
promotes well-being. 
11 For one helpful way to characterise this argument, see Wang (2021, 123). 
and fairness are controlled for, we still have a reason to view cognitive enhancement in a 
negative light, if we care about having valuable achievements. The question at the heart of this 
sort of worry is neatly summarised by Bostrom and Sandberg (2009), who ask: “If cognitive 
abilities are for sale, in the form of a pill or some external aid, would that reduce their value and 
make them less admirable?” 
 
To illustrate the Cheapened Achievements Problem with a thought experiment12, let’s suppose 
that within the same six-month period, two authors write excellent autobiographies based on 
their life experiences—and let’s build into the case the fact that they will earn the same amount 
of money and reach the same level of critical acclaim. However, imagine that the first author 
completes her book using nothing more than coffee and willpower, while the second takes a 
daily dose of a powerful cognitive enhancement drug that improves her focus, reduces her need 
for sleep, boosts her memory and speeds up her problem-solving ability. One might be very 
tempted indeed to credit the second author—the cognitively enhanced author—with a less 
significant achievement. And if we were to be told that this mirrored her own evaluation of her 
achievement, we would likely not be surprised.13 
 
We can find many articulations of the cheapened achievements objection within the 
bioconservative literature. For example, Kass (2004) holds that we lose something of significance 
when our cognitive functioning is enhanced via drugs or technologies. In particular, he argues, 
enhancement divorces performance from effort, giving us an “easy life” filled with “trivial” 
achievements that could otherwise have been valuable. Similarly, Carter and Pritchard (2017) 
draw a useful analogy to computer games here: if we’re trying to complete a difficult quest in a 
game and use a cheat code to super-charge our avatar and get rid of obstacles, it seems like the 
resulting success is less of an achievement that it would otherwise have been.14 Meanwhile, Harris 
(2011) talks about the importance of our “freedom to fall”, suggesting that great achievements 
that rely heavily on enhancement technologies mean less due to a dramatically diminished 
 
12 Here, we adapt a case from Bradford (2015), who focuses on works of fiction as achievements and does not 
discuss the potential impact of cognitive enhancement drugs. 
13 We are following precedent here in discussing the cheapened achievement objection in the context of 
enhancement rather than in the context of therapeutic improvement. For example, the intuition weakens 
significantly when we focus on cases where one relies on e.g., a pill in order to restore baseline levels of 
functioning. While the question of how the cheapened achievements objection applies in therapeutic cases is 
an interesting one, we are here going to be focusing on the objection in the context of the enhancement 
debate.  
14 For a recent and important reply to Carter and Pritchard, see Wang (2021) 
likelihood of making errors. In a similar vein, Agar (2010) suggests that our human fallibility with 
respect to achievements plays a significant role in the strong emotional response we have to 
success. Further, in Sandel (2012, p. 25-26) we find the cheapened achievements objection 
framed in terms of credit and diminished agency—Sandel argues that the more one relies on 
enhancement for an achievement, the more “our admiration for the achievement shifts from the 
[agent] to their pharmacist.” 
 
The above kind of thinking is quite right, we might think, to suggest that we care when external 
factors influence our achievements.15 Indeed, even outside of the debate, we can see 
complementary claims being made. For example, in the literature on the nature and normativity 
of achievement, Gwen Bradford (2013) argues that overcoming difficulty is a necessary 
component of achievements, and that exerting the kind of effort demanded by difficulty is 
responsible for their value.16 Indeed, perhaps it is considerations of difficulty and effort that 
explain the difference in our reactions to the two authors in our example case above.17 In short: 
there is a compelling worry that when we make success easier, the resulting achievements are less 
valuable. Now, is there room for the cognitive enhancement advocate to give a convincing reply? 
 
 
15 It is worth noting that, to some extent, a kind of ‘status quo bias’ will almost inevitably play some role in 
framing our judgments about cheapened achievements. For example, some external artifacts that can enhance 
performance (reliance on a vitamins, eyeglasses that give us 20/20 vision, etc.) are so common in a population 
that we don’t think of them as enhancements, and likewise, even if we might be more inclined to were these 
not part of the status quo. Rather than to think that this point is indicative that the cheapened achievement 
intuition is somehow unreliable or biased in a way that is problematic, one may point out that such a bias will 
be inevitable given that any evaluation of achievements will inescapably be made against some status quo or 
another. For discussion on how the status quo can affect the sense in which we are inclined to ‘relax’ our 
judgments about our dependence on what is part of the status quo, see, e.g., Pritchard (2010).  
16 It is worth noting that we often praise individuals for achievements that might seem effortless to the 
achiever.  
17 As a referee points out, Bradford maintains that, while achievements are, in essence, competently caused 
difficult activities, the value of achievements is not limited to their being difficult, but also is sensitive to the 
extent to which the competent causation manifests rationality on the part of the agent. To the extent that this is 
right, then it might seem as though the following is true: an enhancement’s undermining the extent to which a 
given achievement exhibits rationality on the part of the agent thereby undermines its value (Bradford op. cit., 
p. 122), We maintain that we should be sceptical, however, that Bradford’s point about rationality is correct, at 
least, as a point about the value of achievements as such. Consider, for example, the case of an improvisational 
jazz musician – one whose saxophone improvisation to accompanying piano and drums is intuitive, creative, 
and unrehearsed, and which is accompanied by an experience of ‘flow’ (Hytonen-Ng 2016). It is difficult to see 
how the source of the value of such an achievement lies in any expression of rationality on the part of the 
agent, and this is in particular the case given that conscious rational thinking tends to disrupt the experience of 
flow (see, e.g., Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi 2014). Cases like improvisational jazz cast doubt on the 
generality of Bradford’s claim that it is part of what sources the value of achievements as such is their 
connection to the exercise of rationality on the part of the agent. And this is so even if some achievements involve 
excellent exercises of rationality in virtue of which those particular achievements are valuable.  
2.2 The bioconservative and transhumanist replies 
One reply to the Cheapened Achievements Problem is to simply bite the bullet when it comes to 
the alleged tension between cognitive enhancements and valuable achievements. Such a line 
would involve simply accepting that in order to maximise the value of our cognitive 
achievements, we should, ceteris paribus, maximally forego enhancements. Of course, in some 
cases, other overriding considerations will matter more than the value of an achievement. For 
example, if one is trying to cure some form of cancer and can do so faster with the help of a 
PCE and a brain computer interface, the diminished value of that achievement plausibly means 
very little compared to the resulting reduction in suffering and leap in scientific knowledge. 
However, as the bioconservative response maintains, from the perspective where what we care 
about is maximising the value of our achievements, we ought to give cognitive enhancements a 
wide berth. This, it would seem, is the view that thinkers along the lines of Kass and Sandel 
would adopt. 
 
However, perhaps the bioconservative reply is too quick. Perhaps there’s a better potential 
response to the cheapened achievements objection—one that allows us to take greater 
ownership of enhanced achievements, provided certain conditions are met. 
 
A first pass at a more optimistic line here is found at the opposite end of the spectrum, at which 
the transhumanist might argue that there’s nothing problematic whatsoever about enhanced 
achievements—we are, as Andy Clark suggests in Natural Born Cyborgs (2003), a species that has 
evolved to develop and use tools for augmenting our capacities, and continual pursuit of 
enhancement is just a mark of being human. However, this kind of reply to the Cheapened 
Achievements Problem involves effectively denying the prima facie plausible intuition underlying 
the problem – one that we saw (e.g., in the ‘two writers’ case) is widespread and compelling, and 
for which the transhumanist would arguably have to provide some kind of error theory. Put 
another way, the transhumanist recommends we avoid the problem, but in a way that would 
leave it mysterious why we were even drug into it in the first place. 
 
A more moderate response would not quite bite the bullet, but would still account for the weight 
of the cheapened achievements objection. A promising way to develop such a moderate line 
maintains that the extent to which enhanced achievements are valuable is itself sensitive to facts 
about the relevant biotechnology and the agent’s interaction with that biotechnology. The most 
promising version of that line of reply appears to be the integrationist reply to the Cheapened 
Achievements Problem, to which we’ll now turn. 
 
2.3 The integrationist reply 
At this point in the dialectic, the defender of cognitive enhancement is in a position to make 
good use of recent work on cognitive achievements in social and virtue epistemology. The 
simple template structure of this reply first gives us a more detailed definition of achievement—that 
it is, borrowing from virtue epistemology (e.g., Greco, 2012), a success that is because of (i.e., 
primarily creditable to) ability18. Such a proposal explains why, for example, an arrow shot by a 
skilled archer is not an achievement even if it hits the target, if it does so simply because of a fluke 
gust of wind, or because (say) the arrow had a ‘target detecting’ robot attached to it, which 
ensured it would hit the target. In such cases, the shot is successful in the sense that it attained 
the aim of hitting the target, but in such cases the shot is not successful because of the archer’s 
skill, but because of something (e.g., wind, or the robot) external to their agency.19 
 
With this simple “success because ability” structural view of achievement in play, then (for any 
given cognitive enhancement and achievement) we ought to be asking: is the relevant success 
sufficiently creditable to the person’s ability? While the bioconservative would say ‘no’ and the 
transhumanist would ‘say’ yes – but in each case at the cost of incurring some theoretical baggage 
– the more nuanced integrationist line maintains that the matter of whether—or to what 
extent—using a given cognitive enhancement will cheapen an achievement will depend crucially 
on how we use the enhancement. As this line of thought goes, there are factors that can contribute to 
making cognitive enhancements (such as PCEs) suitably integrated into our cognitive 
architecture—into us, in a sense—such that the resulting success is appropriately creditable to 
our abilities. And this is so even if there are some enhancements we depend on but which are 
not integrated in such a way.  
 
The core idea submitted by the integrationist is that the less an enhancement is cognitively integrated 
into our cognitive architecture, the less the ensuing success we get by relying on the 
enhancement is actually creditable to our own cognitive abilities. On the other side of the coin, if 
 
18 See also Sosa (2015), Pritchard (2012) and Zagzebski (1996) for more details on this account of the nature of 
achievements, as well as for future nuances (e.g., how the account protects achievements—especially cognitive 
achievements—from being mere lucky successes). 
19 For discussion of the archery analogy in particular, see Sosa (2007; 2015).  
the enhancement is integrated (enough), then there is no barrier to attributing the success to our 
abilities.20 
 
The natural question at this juncture is this: what, then, is required for the kind of integration 
that matters for achievement? Here we find a range of answers in social epistemology. In a bit 
more detail, different philosophers have different explanations for what we needs to happen for 
some ‘extra organismic’ scaffolding (including pharmacological cognitive enhancements21) to 
become integrated in our cognitive architecture in such a way that the success we get by relying 
on it would be creditable to our abilities. Some suggested necessary conditions include the 
following (wherein, for ease of reference, ‘D’ represents the relevant drug): 
 
 The process awareness condition (e.g., Pritchard 2010): D is integrated only if the  
subject forms an accurate view of how the wider processes that D uses is reliable. 
 
The sensitivity condition (e.g., Palermos 2015; Carter and Pritchard 2015): D is  
integrated only if the subject is sensitive to different ways that D might malfunction. 
 
The transparency condition (e.g., Clark 2015; Heersmink 2015): D is integrated only if  
D plays the role it does in a way that is transparent, i.e., such that you don’t critically 
scrutinise it. 
 
While these are all different possible necessary conditions on a PCE’s being suitably cognitively 
integrated, all of these authors share a point of commonality: that it takes time for these 
 
20 As noted previously, we are not assuming here (a la Bradford) that it is essential to achievements (as such) 
that a source of their value is an exercise of rationality on the part of the agent. That said, we would like to 
note that even if this claim is assumed, then there would be no barrier to accommodating it on an 
integrationist line. Assume, for some achievement C, that C is valuable in part because of its connection to a 
manifestation of rationality on the part of the agent. Either an enhancement plays some role in facilitating that 
rationality or it does not. If it does not, then the enhancement is irrelevant to whatever contribution rationality 
makes to the value of the achievement. If it does, then – on the kind of integrationist line outlined here – we 
may consider whether the enhancement that impacts the value-adding rational exercise is suitably integrated 
(along the line sketched); if yes, then the enhancement is not a barrier to whatever value rational exercise adds 
to the given achievement. If no, then the integrationist line is able to get the right result, given that, on this 
supposition, the rational exercise at issue would not be suitably attributable to the agents’ abilities given the 
role of the enhancement.   
21 This literature features a wide, inclusive treatment of “extra-organismic scaffolding”, conceiving of it as any 
kind of “extra help” that aids performance but which is not innate—in this sense, cognitive enhancement 
drugs fall into the same category as computer chips, in that they are not part of your naturally endowed 
cognitive architecture. 
conditions to be met. As Prichard (2010, p. 148) puts it, our intuition about whether certain 
cognitive achievements (e.g., knowledge) are creditable to the agent may be negative at first, but 
“as time goes on this intuition lessens.” Meanwhile, as Heersmink (2015, p. 589) notes with 
respect to the transparency condition, novice users of a cognitive enhancement typically lack this 
transparency, and achieving it transparency “in most cases, needs training and may take a 
considerable amount of time” (italics ours).  
 
The thought that these conditions are better met over a lengthy period of enhancement use 
makes sense. For example, it stands to reason that the transparency condition is better met the 
longer a drug is taken—when one begins taking a PCE, it is a novel experience that would likely  
prompt reflection on differences in thinking, in focus, and so on. However, as one becomes 
habituated to taking the relevant PCE, the normalisation of its use plausibly reduces the 
likelihood of one paying much attention to its normal functioning. Sheer duration of use over an 
extended period of time also clearly better positions one to satisfy both the process awareness 
condition and the sensitivity condition—the longer one takes a PCE, the better placed one is, 
with reference to accumulated track record evidence,  to understand both how and when the 
PCE works, and to be alert if something goes wrong (e.g., picking up on the signs that 
something—such as taking a PCE with a large meal22—has slowed down the speed at the drug is 
absorbed and takes effect). 
 
Accordingly, then, advocates of all three of the above potential necessary conditions on cognitive 
integration agree that the best way to meet these necessary conditions is to use the enhancement 
reliably over time. In sum, this consistent, repeated use is a key part of what is supposed to allow 
us to integrate a cognitive enhancement in a way that suffices for enhancement-facilitated 
successes to be valuable achievements.  
 
For present purposes, we will set aside substantive critiques of the integrationist line itself, and 
accept that it does offer at least a prima facie plausible response to the Cheapened Achievements 
Problem—especially when compared to the other two main responses. Against that background, 
we want to focus on how research in medicine and pharmacology illuminates an unexplored 
dilemma for the integrationist strategy just sketched—one that reveals the Problem of 
 
22 See e.g., Gilman et al. (2001) for an elaboration of how one current PCE—Modafinil—is absorbed and 
excreted. 
Cheapened Achievements to be more difficult to address than has been appreciated (at least in 
some cases).  
 
However, before proceeding, we want to clarify two additional points about the integrationist 
reply, in order to make explicit what it does and does not take for granted. For one thing, the 
integrationist line is assuming two ability-based claims about the structure of achievements and 
about their value – viz., that (i) achievements are successes primarily creditable to ability; and that 
(ii) the source of the value of an achievement (over and above the value of a mere success) lies in 
part in the success’s arising from ability.  
 While both assumptions (i) and (ii) are common in the literature on achievement in virtue 
epistemology (Greco 2010; Sosa 2007; Pritchard 2012; see also Feinberg 1970), they invite the 
following kind of rejoinder to assumption (i): no success is due entirely to an individual’s ability, 
nor could it be rightly credited (entirely) to such an ability. This is because the fact that we have 
the dispositions, including abilities, we have is itself highly contingent upon other previous 
causes – including to a kind of egalitarian ‘brute luck’23 (e.g., in the cognitive case, that we were 
born with particular kinds of cognitive faculties rather than others).24 Appreciation of this point, 
the rejoinder maintains, suggests it is mistaken to articulate achievements as successes primarily 
due to individuals themselves, ignoring the extent to which individuals’ own capacities are always 
themselves beholden to fortune. In response to this concern, it’s important to clarify the kind of 
‘template’ characterisation of achievement that the integrationist is taking for granted, and which 
is standard in virtue epistemology. Crucially, primary credit can be understood in a strong, 
unrestricted sense (where ability would be contrasted on equal footing with all other factors that 
feature in a complete history of the relevant success), or in a more restricted sense that is indexed 
to causal-explanatory salience (Greco 2007; 2010). On the latter view – which is what we have in 
mind – what the kind of attribution of success to ability that lines up with achievement requires 
is just that one’s ability be (following here John Greco 2010) what is most explanatorily salient 
when giving an explanation of the relevant success – viz., as the most salient part of the causal 
 
23 As an anonymous referee notes, it might well be that the radically diverse distribution pattern of cognitive 
capacities in a given population, patterns that are themselves beholden to luck, offer a moral justification for 
cognitive enhancement in the case of those who are unfortunate in this ‘lottery’. We are sympathetic to this 
suggestion, though it goes beyond the scope of our aims here to make a moral case for justifying cognitive 
enhancement. For discussions on this issue, see Giubilini and Minerva (2019) and Savulescu and Sandberg 
(2008), 
24 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting we engage with this point.  
explanation for the success. This articulation is compatible with there being a wide number of 
factors that play a role in the causal history of the relevant success.  
 A second point of clarification concerns assumption (ii), viz., that the source of the value 
of an achievement (over and above the value of a mere success) lies in part in the success’s arising 
from ability. This is, we want to emphasise, a minimal assumption about what contributes to the 
value of achievement, and it is not meant to rule out possible alternative sources of the value of 
achievement whenever a success is primarily due to ability. For example, when a success is 
primarily due to ability, it might be that the achievement gains additional value in virtue of the 
level of exertion, or will-power exercised by the agent, and regardless of how high-level her 
capacity is to perform. Theoretically, at least, there is no barrier to the possibility (e.g., in the 
more long-term future) that these other contributory sources of value to an achievement might 
themselves be susceptible to enhancement.25 For example, on the assumption that a success 
primarily due to ability is such that its value is (in some contexts) magnified by the addition of 
additional exertion or manifestation of will power, we could envision cases where that very will-
power or effort capacity is itself subject to a kind of ‘boost’ via enhancement. We want to 
register that an integrationist line – given the assumptions it makes about achievement and its 
value – is not incompatible with countenancing such an idea, and it can diagnose achievement 
cases featuring a valuable exertion of will-power in a principled way. In short, on the 
integrationist line, an enhancement that directly impacts will power (in the way described above) 
is either itself going to be suitably integrated, or not; if yes, then the enhancement is not a barrier 
to whatever value willpower-exertion adds to the value of a given achievement. If no, then the 
integrationist line is able to get the right result, given that, on this supposition, the willpower’s 
contribution would not be suitably creditable attributable to the agent.    
 
3. Cognitive enhancement and the risk of dependence 
As it turns out, a potential worry for the integrationist reply to the Cheapened Achievements 
Problem lies waiting in the wings. In order to uncover the worry, it will be important to consider 
some of the costs of integration itself, in the case of pharmacological cognitive enhancements.  
 
3.1 Provisional PCEs: a primer 
Adderall, Ritalin and Modafinil are most commonly discussed as viable examples or prototypes 
in the cognitive enhancement debate—consequently, we will call these “provisional PCEs”. It is 
 
25 Thanks to an anonymous referee for registering this point.  
when we look at their theorised mechanism of action and effects that we begin to see specific 
risks they pose—risks that, we will argue, have a specific and important implication for 
integrationist replies to the Cheapened Achievements Problem. 
 
Adderall is a mixed amphetamine salt, peak plasma concentrations of which peak approximately 
three hours post-ingestion26. Amphetamines are sympathomimetic noncatecholamines with CNS 
stimulant activity—their mechanism is poorly understood, but they are thought to limit reuptake 
of dopamine and noradrenaline to the presynaptic terminal. Crucially, amphetamines target the 
same receptors as the body’s endogenous catecholamines, such as dopamine and noradrenaline. 
The chemical structure of amphetamines is very similar to those of the brain’s monoamine 
neurotransmitters. Due to their sharing of a similar chemical structure, amphetamines are 
competitive substrates for transporters of the brain’s own monoamine neurotransmitters, some 
of the most important being the transporter for noradrenaline (NET), dopamine (DAT) and 
serotonin or 5-HT (SERT). The ingestion of amphetamine accordingly causes changes in the 
levels of these neurons, and it is from the changing extracellular levels of these neurons that the 
behavioural and physical effects of amphetamines result. As powerful psychostimulants, they 
increase feelings of alertness, euphoria and wakefulness. They take primary effect centrally, 
however they also exert peripheral, autonomic side-effects, like sweating, nausea and tachycardia. 
Breathing rate increases, blood pressure increases and locomotor changes are seen. The mood 
changes are described as affecting feelings of ‘novelty, arousal, anxiety [and] reward’ (Ferruci et 
al., 2019). 
 
Methylphenidate Hydrochloride (i.e., MPH)—commonly known as Ritalin—is a psychostimulant 
with similar properties, with the immediate-release tablets reaching their maximum concentration 
in just under 2 hours27. In its increase of extracellular dopamine levels, MPH amplifies task-
specific signal-amplifying and noise-reducing effects of dopamine, meaning the subject taking 
MPH becomes less easily distractible and more focused and attentive—for example, Volkow et 
al. (2002) determined that MPH-facilitated dopamine increases would likely increase the ‘interest 
[the task] elicits’ and therefore improve the subject’s performance in that task. Peripheral side 
effects include agitation and aggression, autonomic effects such as increased heart rate, raised 
blood pressure and visual disturbances. Further, MPH should be used with caution in those with 
 
26 See e.g., Heal et al. (2013) and Ferrucci et al. (2019) for a pharmacological and clinical perspective on 
amphetamine. 
27 See e.g., Volkow et al. (2002) for details on a PET-informed perspective on methylphenidate’s mechanism of 
action. 
a psychiatric history, including previous psychosis or bipolar disorder, and in a small number of 
cases (0.1%) it can elicit new psychosis or manic symptoms. Due to inter-individual variability in 
users of CNS stimulant drugs, it is currently ‘difficult to predict’ who will respond well to the 
drug (Kimko et al., 1999). Like amphetamine, the mechanism of action of this provisional PCE  
remains vague, but MPH is thought to stimulate dopamine release from the presynaptic vesicles, 
and inhibit dopamine reuptake back into presynaptic neurons—less selectively than 
amphetamine (Scahill et al., 2004). 
 
The third notable provisional PCE we will consider herein is modafinil (i.e., Provigil), a non-
amphetamine type oral stimulant commonly used to treat narcolepsy (a brain condition that 
causes a person to fall asleep suddenly at inappropriate times)28. The maximum drug 
concentrations in the circulation are reached after 2-4 hours, and steady states of modafinil are 
achieved after 2-4 days of taking the drug. Modafinil is best known for its promotion of alertness 
and reducing daytime sleepiness, but it also causes mood changes and alters perception and 
thinking. Again, as with both Adderall (i.e., mixed amphetamine salt) and Methylphenidate, the 
mechanism of action of Modafinil is not well understood—it appears to act similarly to the 
sympathomimetic agents, yet along different mechanisms. Some studies have suggested that 
Modafinil action is dependent upon the dopamine transporter (DAT) and has weak interactions 
with dopamine, noradrenaline, orexin, histamine and serotonin receptors (Gerrard, 2020)—
though it doesn’t seem to promote spontaneous release of dopamine in the same way as 
amphetamine (Simon et al., 1995). 
 
3.2 Why provisional PCEs come with a burden of tolerance, dependence and abuse 
potential 
Drug tolerance results after continued, ‘chronic’ use (i.e., continued use over time) creating a 
dependence which in turn results in the ‘progressive requirement to use higher drug doses to 
produce a given effect’ (increasing the risk of side effects)29. Tolerance—where regular increases 
in dose are required maintain effectiveness—also boosts the risk of dangerous side effects. In the 
case of provisional PCEs, the brain is not programmed to have consistently high levels of these 
extracellular neurotransmitters, and its homeostatic mechanisms cause it to try and counter the 
effects of the stimulant drugs. In order to adapt, the brain produces less neurotransmitters and 
 
28 See e.g., Alacam et al. (2018) for a more detailed account of modafinil’s use and effectiveness. 
29 Some authors see drug tolerance as the body’s attempt to return to homeostasis, incorporating initial drug 
levels into its system to return to a type of pre-drug state (e.g., Koob and Bloom, 1988). 
expresses less neurotransmitter receptors, creating a hypofunctioning reward system that makes 
the effects of the drugs become less potent—prompting users to take more of the drug.  
 
Dependence, meanwhile, encompasses two facets: physiological dependence and psychological 
dependence30. 
 
Physiological dependence: an adaptive state that manifests itself by intense physical 
disturbances when the administration of a drug is suspended. 
 
Psychological dependence: a condition in which a drug produces a feeling of 
satisfaction and psychic drive that requires periodic or continuous administration of the 
drug to produce pleasure or to avoid discomfort. 
 
Drug dependence is thought to begin with positive reinforcement (Kreek and Koob, 1998)— the 
user experiences the euphoria and cognitive assonance of the stimulant, which corresponds with 
an increased desire to continue their drug use. In the case of provisional PCEs such as those 
above, noradrenaline plays a role in increasing energy, and dopamine provides a pleasurable 
feeling of wellbeing. Later, negative reinforcement then joins the previous, positive 
reinforcement—after stopping drug intake for a period, the user experiences unpleasant 
withdrawal symptoms (e.g., dysphoria, decreased activity, lack of independent thought and 
increased drowsiness), and this prompts chronic use of the drug. Consequently, negative 
reinforcement is referred to as the “driving force of addiction” (Kollins et al., 2001). 
 
There is a particularly high abuse potential—a drug’s ability to keep a person dependent on it 
with provisional PCEs and any drugs that act similarly. Once it is cleared, the ‘up’ effects of a 
provisional PCE will wear off, causing the user to feel relatively ‘down’. The capacity of the drug 
to then correct the negative feeling its absence has left encourages the user to continue their use 
of the drug. The physical reasons for the abuse potential of provisional PCEs include the fact 
that they provide increased energy (via noradrenaline production) and a pleasurable feeling of 
well-being (via dopamine production)31. Meanwhile, some psychological reasons for this might 
include the confidence, self-esteem and day-to-day happiness that will likely wax and wane 
 
30 This (conventional) distinction comes from Eddy et al. (1965). 
31 See e.g., Gottlieb (2001). 
depending on whether one is experiencing the peak of cognition-sharpening effects of cognitive 
enhancement.32 
 
Abuse potential is unsurprisingly related to addiction potential.33Not everyone who uses—or 
even abuses—a substance becomes an “addict”, and it is not completely clear in the literature as 
to how to spot someone likely to be predisposed to addictive vulnerability (for example, some 
studies discuss genetic factors (e.g., Kreek et al., 2005) whilst others (e.g., Hellam et al., 2015) 
detail environmental or social problems). Regardless of individual variances in susceptibility, 
Morton et. al (2000) note that clinicians should judge the potency of methylphenidate—for 
example—using descriptions of the effects elicited by better-known addictive substances, such as 
cocaine and methamphetamine (its more well-known, addictive relatives). And although 
modafinil is generally thought to be less worrying in this respect, some research (e.g., Kollins et 
al., 2001) suggests that it increases the rating scale of the Addiction Research Center Inventory 
(ARCI) “as much as amphetamine.” 
 
Sussman and Sussman (2011, pp. 4026-4030) provide an account of the five main components 
central to forming addictions, and it is easy to see how provisional PCEs could lead to meeting 
these conditions. 
 
1. Partaking in a certain course of action to fulfil motives (e.g., taking amphetamines to 
study more effectively). 
2. Becoming preoccupied with that course of action (e.g., thinking about taking “smart 
drugs” more and more frequently), 
3. Temporary satiation: a small time period which occurs after starting a habit where the 
“drug” or other tool does work to provide the user with feelings of fulfilment and 
satisfaction, without the appearance of cravings. 
4. Loss of control: when a user wants to stop their use of the drug or other action but not 
being aware of how to control urges and prevent future use; ‘the addictive behaviour may 
 
32 Note that we here only scratch the surface of the psychological impact of PCEs and how that impact might 
contribute to psychological dependence. For example, there are possibly fruitful comparisons to be drawn 
between using cognitive enhancements and engaging in other “self-perfecting” activities (e.g., plastic surgery, 
diets, and other appearance enhancements). See e.g., Chatterjee (2007) in particular for an exploration of 
parallels between what he calls “cosmetic neurology” and cosmetic surgery. 
33 Where we think of addiction roughly as an inability to stop a behaviour (often, but not always, something 
harmful). 
become increasingly more automatic’ (e.g., one simply takes a nootropic as soon as they 
get up, or as soon as they sit down to take part in an academic task). 
5. Suffering negative consequences (e.g., ‘physical discomfort’, like feeling agitated or 
withdrawn without amphetamines, or ‘financial loss’, after spending £50 a week (a rough 
approximation) on PCEs). 
 
The potential for abuse (and possible addiction) is emphasized throughout the literature and 
should serve as a warning to clinicians. We also suggest that the changing function of these drugs 
from therapeutic interventions to enhancements carries the risk of aggravating abuse potential. 
And—perhaps most importantly—we have good reason to think that we can expect future 
PCEs to carry similar risks given the relevant underlying neurological mechanisms. Most future 
PCEs are likely to also exert action upon noradrenaline and dopamine’s extracellular 
concentrations, translating to increase cognitive capacities (e.g., alertness, focus, and processing 
speed) - and so come with the same risks as provisional PCEs. 
 
Crucially, these concerns are just as likely to apply to future PCEs. Note that the provisional 
PCEs discussed herein are classed as such because of their neurological mechanisms. They all 
exert action upon noradrenaline and dopamine’s extracellular concentrations, and through this 
specific means, they take effect in ways that translate into increasing our cognitive capacities, 
whether this is through increased alertness or wakefulness, or increased ability to focus. Now, 
Adderall, Ritalin and Modafinil are “back-door” PCEs34—their current pharmaceutical indication 
is not to cognitively enhance healthy individuals, but to treat those with identified disorders (e.g., 
ADHD and narcolepsy). However, with their prominent presence in the human enhancement 
literature, it is fair to assume that future PCEs will be based on refined examples of these drugs. 
This means that we shall face the same problems as we do with the current provisional PCEs.  
 
In sum, the important takeaway here, for our purposes, is this: provisional PCEs carry with them 
a burden of tolerance and dependence, as well as a high potential for abuse—and these are all 
worries that will apply equally to future drugs using similar mechanisms. We’ll now explore how 




34 Here we borrow the front-door/back-door distinction from Buchanan (2017). 
4. Cognitive enhancement and integration: a dilemma 
The likely possibility of dependence and abuse (also correlated with higher likelihood of risks to 
health) seems to throw a new spanner in the works, in so far as we might appeal to an 
integrationist line as a response to the Problem of Cheapened Achievements. In particular, in 
light of the empirical results just canvassed, it looks like we’re left with the following prima facie 
problematic options: 
 
Horn 1: Valuable achievements (due to appropriately integrated cognitive enhancements) 
at the risk of tolerance and dependence (and all the associated safety risks) due to 
consistent, long-term use. 
 
Horn 2: Avoid tolerance/dependence through more sporadic use, but at the cost of 
integration and thereby of valuable achievements. 
 
In the face of this dilemma, it looks like the three most salient lines of reply are as follows. 
Firstly, we could simply give up on any kind of integrationist reply—which, recall, pursues a 
middle ground to the Achievements Problem—and instead embrace one of the extremes (a 
strong bioconservative line or a transhumanist line). Problematically, however, neither of those 
other positions was promising. The second option on the table is to take horn 1 of the dilemma 
for the integrationist and preserve the value of enhancement-aided achievement at the cost of 
physical dependency (and its attendant risks). Meanwhile, the third option involves taking horn 2 
of the dilemma—avoiding drug dependency (i.e., via only sporadic use) at the cost of the kind of 
integration that is plausibly needed to make sense of how the enhancement-aided success is an 
achievement to which we can credit you. 
 
None of these options looks particularly appealing. So, does this mean that the Cheapened 
Achievements Problem is simply unresolvable? In spite of raising the above dilemma for the 
integrationist, we want to close by suggesting that it’s too early to simply conclude that there’s no 
satisfying response to the Cheapened Achievements Problem. More specifically, notice that one 
of the key contributors to the dilemma for the integrationist response is the fact that current 
pharmacological cognitive enhancements have some of the side effects they do—but this is only 
contingently so. It is not an essential feature of cognitive enhancements (pharmacological or 
otherwise) that they, for example, are detrimentally dependency-forming in the ways that current 
pharmacological enhancements are. 
 
The foregoing observation offers us a new vantage point to realistically assess the Cheapened 
Achievements Problem. Rather than to either give up on the integrationist reply in favour of one 
of the ‘nonstarter’ responses, or to think that either horn 1 or horn 2 of the dilemma for the 
integrationist reply as (given currently technologies) clearly preferable to the other, we are in a 
position to view the lay of the land with a clear head. The realistic view here is that preserving 
the value of pharmacologically enhanced achievements might work in the future. This will 
depend on the future of medicine and technology—on whether pharmacological 
bioenhancements will be developed that can be used more than merely sporadically but without 
the relationship to dependency and other side effects that empirical research shows our current 
options have.  
 
Meanwhile, if such pharmacological cognitive enhancement cannot be developed, then we still 
have the potential to have enhanced achievements that are primarily creditable to us (via 
integration)—so long as we are using technology-based enhancements like BCIs and implants, 
and we use these pieces of technology in the way required to meet the conditions for cognitive 
integration.35 To the extent that we value cognitive achievement, the foregoing also recommends 
that we direct cognitive enhancement research toward technological solutions as opposed to 
pharmacological interventions.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
We have explored several potential response to the common worry that cognitive enhancement 
may “cheapen” cognitive achievement. After dismissing the transhumanist and bioconservative 
responses as problematic in principle for different reasons, we highlighted the comparatively 
more promising integrationist defence—a line of argument that draws on social and virtue 
epistemology to respond to the Problem of Cheapened Achievements. However, in unpacking 
the temporal component of this defence and considering the risks associated with cognitive 
enhancement drugs that share a particular set of neural mechanisms, we saw that the 
integrationist is faced with a dilemma. They can risk dependency and addiction while gaining 
 
35 It is difficult to predict how far away we are presently from such technologies; that said, recent and rapid 
advances in deep neural networks in medicine give some cause for optimism.  
credit for their cognitive achievements (and thereby retaining their value), or they can avoid such 
physical and psychological risks but forego integration and the valuable achievements it brings.36  
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